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Abstract 
Abstract modeling, such as using epidemic models, has been the general method of choice for understanding and analyzing the 
high-level effects of worms.  However, high-fidelity models, such as packet-level models, are indispensable for moving beyond 
aggregate effects, to capture finer nuances and complexities associated with known and future worms in realistic network 
environments.  Here, we first identify the spectrum of available alternatives for worm modeling, and classify them according to 
their scalability and fidelity.  Among them, we focus on three high-fidelity methods for modeling of worms, and study their 
effectiveness with respect to scalability.  Employing these methods, we are then able to, respectively, achieve some of the largest 
packet-level simulations of worm models to date; implant and attack actual worm monitoring/defense installations inside large 
simulated networks; and identify a workaround for real-time requirement that fundamentally constrains worm modeling at the 
highest fidelity levels. 
1. Introduction 
Abstract models such as epidemic models have so far 
been the general means of choice for modeling worm 
propagation.  However, such models are limited with 
respect to generality due to their many simplifying 
assumptions.  They are useful for certain studies, such as 
post mortem analysis, but otherwise poor in versatility.  
This is especially true in their inability to accommodate 
complex scenarios, such as sophisticated worms, elaborate 
defense mechanisms, rich network topologies and variety in 
background traffic. 
An effective alternative is packet-level modeling, which is 
capable of capturing many fine details and scenario variants.  
However, packet-level simulations have so far been 
considered prohibitively expensive computationally.  Few 
packet-level models have been employed for large-scale 
simulation studies of worms.  A reason behind the limited 
use of packet-level models is that, until recently, it has been 
constrained by sequential execution.  Lately, with the advent 
of effective parallel/distributed processing techniques, 
packet-level network simulations are enabling the execution 
of very large-scale network models (a few millions of nodes) 
at packet-level.  These parallel systems support large-scale 
configurations of detailed software models of routers and 
links of the network, loaded by synthetic traffic introduced 
at end-host models.  By utilizing such scalable packet-level 
simulation environments, it is now possible to effectively 
simulate and analyze the propagation (and other) behaviors 
associated with worms, under realistic large-scale 
phenomena such as network congestion, feedback and rich 
topological layouts.  Moreover, these packet-level 
environments can be incrementally augmented on demand, 
with additional models, such as of defense/quarantining 
mechanisms at end-hosts and/or gateway/core routers. 
By exercising this new level of packet-level fidelity 
enabled by the state-of-the-art parallel network simulators, 
here we undertake worm modeling at a large-scale, and 
explore the current (quantitative) limits of those 
environments.  The issues, challenges and results in the 
development of these large-scale, packet-level worm models 
constitute the first component in our contributions. 
In our second component, we explore the possibility of 
further increasing the fidelity afforded by the packet-level 
models, by focusing on substituting parts of the large-scale 
network with real operational systems.  In particular, we 
look at the issue of incorporating live monitoring/defense 
systems into a large simulated network.  A honeypot system 
is immersed in the virtual network, yet it is made oblivious 
to the fact that it is operating within a virtual world.  We 
describe issues and challenges in enabling such a capability, 
which we call constructive emulation.  As will be described in 
greater detail later, this differs from traditional network 
emulation systems in a significant way. 
Finally, in our third component, we present a novel 
architecture, namely, full system virtualization, which is 
designed to resolve the scalability problems inherent in 
methods in which virtual models interact with real systems.  
While almost all high-fidelity systems are limited at one scale 
or another by real time execution constraint, this fully 
virtualized system is free from the constraint (hence 
arbitrarily scalable in theory), albeit at some cost of 
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degraded computational efficiency. 
The rest of the document is organized as follows.  
Section 2 presents the spectrum of worm modeling 
alternatives and motivates the need for high-fidelity worm 
modeling. Issues, challenges and results from large-scale 
packet-level worm modeling are described in Section 3.  
Constructive emulation and its application to honeypot 
emulation are presented in Section 4.  The full system 
virtualization approach is outlined in Section 5.  Finally, 
conclusions and future work are presented in Section 6. 
2. Modeling Alternatives 
 
Figure 1: Range of alternatives for computer worm modeling.  
Scalability data ranges are based on current day capabilities 
of testbeds and tools reported in the literature. 
Figure 1
The spectrum of alternatives for worm modeling is 
shown in .  These alternatives roughly mimic the 
alternatives for network modeling in general.  For example, 
hardware testbeds developed for broad network research 
can be applied for studying worms as well, since worms 
only represent a special case of network applications. 
Scalability of a method is defined as a limit on the 
number of network nodes modeled by that method.  
Network nodes include end-hosts and routers.  Fidelity is in 
general harder to define, but it is possible to compare two 
methods with respect to their relative fidelity.  Fidelity could 
be the based on the amount of detail accounted for in the 
network (e.g., routing, network congestion, etc.), or in end-
hosts (e.g., stack processing, operating system overheads, 
application processing artifacts, etc.). 
Hardware testbeds have improved in scale with recent 
advancements, with network testbeds scaling to hundreds or 
more nodes (e.g., EmuLab[1, 2]).  However, hardware 
testbeds cannot by themselves sustain fidelity with 
increasing scale.  In fact, hardware testbeds resort to some 
form of network simulation underneath to improve fidelity 
when virtual configurations exceed physical resources in 
size (e.g., to emulate link delays or losses). 
The next level of scalability is achieved via network 
emulation.  Emulation systems for network security analysis 
also have scaled in size, with recent emulators capable of 
sustaining a few thousand nodes (e.g., NetLab[2] and 
ModelNet[3]), and are being used in major network security 
studies (e.g., the DETER project[4]).  Both hardware 
testbeds as well as emulation systems are by definition 
executed in real-time. 
The next logical alternative is packet-level simulation.  
Historically, network simulation experiments have always 
been done on small scale and the results of such 
experiments have been extrapolated to derive conclusion on 
large scale simulations.  However, results on small scale are 
hard to extrapolate to larger configurations and hence can 
be misleading.  Large scale network simulations are thus 
required for detailed and realistic simulations, where 
individual network parameters might produce significant 
difference in the behavior of experiments. One of the main 
problems in running large scale simulations is the scalability 
of the network simulators.  Packet-level simulation has seen 
great advances, especially due to parallel/distributed 
execution capabilities of network simulators (e.g., PDNS 
and GTNetS[5]).  Scales of up to a few million nodes have 













Hybrid simulations, using a combination of fluid and 
packet level models have been used scale network 
simulations by at least another order of magnitude[8, 9], but 
they have been largely constrained in generality (e.g., limited 
accounting for feedback effects).  Further, they are 
restricted to core network (backbone links and routers), and 
difficult to extend to worm application traffic at end-hosts. 
Use of simplified epidemic models, such as the SIR 
model, is quite widespread in the literature (e.g., see [10]).  
They are the most scalable as they simply use a system of 
(differential) equations, but also exhibit the least fidelity due 
to their simplifying assumptions about network and traffic 
dynamics.  Mixed abstraction simulations have also been 
designed that aim to combine the fidelity of packet-level 
worm models (in subnets of interest), with the scalability of 
aggregate epidemic models[11, 12] (in other uninteresting 
portions of the network). 
As can be seen, packet-level simulation exhibits the best 
tradeoff between scalability and fidelity, and holds potential 
to sustain Internet-scale experiments without great loss of 
flexibility or accuracy.  Complex worms can be easily 
modeled in terms of their TCP/IP packet exchange 
behavior, and the simulation can be enhanced as needed 
if/when new defense mechanisms or new worm types are 
explored (e.g., worms based on header spoofing, or 
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reasons, we focus on packet-level models as surrogates for 
large-scale networks in worm modeling, as described in 
Section 3. 
We also explore ways to immerse actual defense 
installations into surrogate virtual networks to test such 
installations under controlled, repeatable attack scenarios, as 
described in Section 4.  High-fidelity modeling enables 
constructive emulation, which in turn can obviate the 
development of models for operational defense/monitoring 
installations such as honeypots[14] or other early warning 
apparatus[14]. 
At sufficiently large levels of scale (e.g., hundreds of 
thousands of nodes or larger), most high-fidelity systems 
break down, because of their inability to keep up with real-
time for their “real-system” components.  For such large 
scales, we propose a fully virtualized system to overcome their 
inherent real-time constraint, without sacrificing fidelity.  
The fully virtualized system has the potential for achieving 
the highest fidelity among all approaches, even higher than 
that of a general hardware testbed.  Theoretically it is not 
limited in scalability, but it is only limited practically by the 
amount of computation power available.  This approach is 
described in greater detail in Section 5. 
3. Packet-level Modeling & Execution 
3.1. Simulators 
To develop packet-level worm models, we chose two 
parallel network simulators that represent the state-of-the-
art: PDNS and GTNetS.  The Parallel and Distributed 
Network Simulator (PDNS) is an extension of the popular 
ns-2 simulator.  The Georgia Tech Network Simulator 
(GTNetS) is a C++-based simulator developed at Georgia 
Tech.  Both these packages were downloaded from their 
publicly available websites[15, 16].  We chose these 
packages due to our familiarity with them, although one 
could choose another similar parallel simulator such as 
DaSSF[17]. 
The simulators allow an arbitrary subject network 
configuration to be specified (topology, normal user traffic, 
etc.) and initialized accordingly.  Normal user traffic can be 
realized as end-applications with either customized packet-
level behavior or aggregate statistical traffic.  Malware 
(worms) can be injected, activated, and/or initialized into 
this network.  Complex scripts of attack/detection/defense 
scenarios can then be enacted.  Several different types of 
outputs can be obtained from the simulated scenarios, 
including the obvious ones such as the number of infected 
hosts at any given instant.  Since the test-bed is a time-
controlled software-based simulation, certain network 
measurements and statistics can be obtained from the 
scenario execution, which are difficult or impossible to 
obtain in a hardware test-bed (e.g., sub-millisecond 
granularity of network event statistics, or an accurate global 
snapshot of entire network).  Both simulators boast 
demonstrated scalability, simulating several million TCP/IP 
packet transfers in a single wall-clock second. 
We have developed worm models in both PDNS and 
GTNetS.  Both implementations realize the generalized 
worm model framework described next. 
3.2. Models 
As a generalization of several worm types, we chose the 
model depicted in . This model contains the 
following components: 
Figure 2
Figure 2: Models of vulnerable worm nodes, agents and their 
interaction sequence. 
• Worm Node: This represents an end-host in the 
network which can potentially act as a node spreading the 
worm. 
• Vulnerable Server: This is an application class which 
represents the flawed network service that is penetrated 
by the worms to infect the host machine. 
• Shooting Agents: Once a worm node is compromised, 
Shooting Agents take over the task of propagating the 
worm from the current host to other vulnerable hosts. 
• Backdoor Agents: These agents model the backdoor 
entry which is opened by the initial infection on a 
vulnerable host.  The backdoor is used to transfer larger 
worm payload, if any. 
We start the simulation by marking one node as the 
infected node. A shooting agent is instantiated and its starts 
generating random scans for spreading the infection. 
 
Infected Node Worm Node 










  As illustrated in Figure 2, the following steps are 
involved during the worm propagation. 
1. The shooting agent finds a random host and makes a 
connection to that host. A vulnerable server on the 
worm node responds to this connection request and the 
shooting agent transfers a payload to it.  This typically 
models a worm’s initial step (e.g., malicious URL sent by 
a worm to a web server). 
2. The infection triggers a backdoor port to be opened on 
the worm node. 
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3. The worm payload is (attempted to be) transferred to 
the worm node by initiating a connection to the opened 
backdoor port. 
4. Once the worm payload is transferred the worm 
application instantiates a shooting agent on the worm 
node. This node is now infected and follows the 
preceding steps to propagate itself. 
5. The original worm is finished with this infection 
attempt, and hence goes back to repeating the preceding 
steps all over again.  An adjustable delay is modeled 
between infections at this step. 
Model Parameters 
Almost every aspect of the preceding model is 
customizable via a corresponding parameter.  The following 
are examples of such parameters: 
• Scan Rate: The scan rate in worm propagation could 
affect the overall pattern of the infection. This parameter 
is configurable in our system.  Multi-threaded worms are 
modeled by instantiating on one shooting agent per 
thread on each node. 
• Topology: The worm model we have developed is 
completely independent of the underlying network 
topology. One could deploy our model in any kind of 
network topology by just instantiating the vulnerable 
nodes and attaching the corresponding agents to those 
nodes. 
• Background traffic: During the worm propagation we 
inject normal traffic going through the network. The 
amount and pattern of background traffic could affect 
the propagation of a worm. In our model, one could 
introduce background traffic in addition to the normal 
worm traffic. 
3.3. Unused IP Addresses 
In the Internet, not all IP addresses allocated to an 
organization are used. “Holes” are typically present in the 
address space covered by each organization.  Packets 
destined to these unused addresses usually travel all the way 
to the closest router of the unused address and then get 
dropped at that router.  Such packet drops corresponding to 
unused IP addresses become the common case during 
worm propagation, and hence become especially important 
to model accurately. 
When worm models generate random IP addresses 
during their scans, packets destined to unused IP addresses 
should not be dropped at the source, because doing so will 
not correctly model congestion effects that would otherwise 
be created by such packets further down in the network. 
Unfortunately, most network simulators drop the 
packets at the source if their destination is not present in the 
simulated network topology (some simulators are even 
worse in that they terminate with a runtime error).  We were 
faced with this challenge, namely, to find a way to model 
this correctly. 
Maximal Prefix Match Scheme 
One way to deal with this is to modify the simulator to 
route the packet as far as it can, similar to the Internet’s 
operation.  While an entirely accurate approach would be to 
model the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), modeling BGP 
in fully glory is an extremely complex endeavor.  A 
compromise is to perform “maximal prefix match” on 
addresses – route a packet towards the address that 
maximally matches the prefix of the packet’s destination 
address[18].  A drawback of this approach is that it requires 
complex overhaul of the simulator.  Another disadvantage is 
that the prefix match operation potentially needs to be 
performed at every hop along the packet path, incurring 
substantial runtime overhead. 
Blackhole Scheme 
We developed a novel approach that is an efficient 
alternative to the preceding approach and avoids both 
aforementioned drawbacks.  At every intermediate router, a 
“blackhole” end-host is instantiated and attached to that 
router.  The blackhole is assigned a unique unused IP 
address that is reachable via that router.  A table is 
maintained that maps the subnets reachable via a router to 
its corresponding blackhole router.  Instantiated (used) IP 
addresses simply map to themselves.  When a source 
generates a packet, it first checks the table to determine the 
mapped address for the destination address.  For used IP 
addresses, the destination remains unchanged since they 
map to themselves in the mapping table.  For unused IP 
addresses, the destination is replaced by the blackhole 
address whose subnet maximally matches the original 
destination address.  The blackhole end-hosts are 
configured to simply drop all packets destined to them. 
This scheme ensures three things: (1) it forwards packets 
to the blackhole closest to the unused IP address (2) 
performs the maximal prefix mapping exactly once per 
packet (3) the lookup into the mapping table is optimized to 
reduce the table size by eliminating the identity mapping for 
used IP addresses if the addresses happen to be contiguous.  
While this scheme pushes the modeling burden to the user, 
this was not a major problem for us, since the random IP 
address generation is quite isolated and easy to modify in 
our worm models. 
3.4. Other Issues 
Pre-allocation 
One of the first things which could be done to improve 
runtime performance is to minimize dynamic memory 
allocation. To this effect one could pre-allocate buffers 
during initialization and reuse them at runtime.  Pre-
allocation was done at all possible place to reduce runtime 
overhead.  This includes pre-allocation of sufficient number 
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3.5. Performance Study of TCP agents for modeling incoming and outgoing 
connections made by the worms.  Without pre-allocation, 
this overhead could dominate the simulation runtime, 























Connection Modeling Overhead 
Based on our past experience with PDNS and GTNetS, 
we chose PDNS as our initial modeling platform.  Generally 
speaking, PDNS exhibits higher simulation speed than 
GTNetS (as measured by net TCP/IP packet transmissions 
simulated per wall-clock second), and hence we chose 
PDNS to develop our worm models.  However, for 
simulating TCP connections, it turns out that the per-
connection overhead is quite high in PDNS.  The overhead 
is so high that the net number of worm infections simulated 
per wall-clock second is no where close to its benchmarked 
packet transmission rate.  PDNS uses OTcl and C++ and 
switches between the two during execution.  This switching 
introduces significant overhead in large-scale simulations.  
For instance, we found that simulation of a new TCP 
connection establishment can take at least a millisecond. 
Figure 3: Initial propagation phases of a Code Red II-like 
worm in a 1,280,000-node network.  Interestingly, exponential 
increase in infections is observed to start in as early as 35 
seconds since initial infection.  Experiment uses GTNetS at 
packet-level on a 128-CPU Linux cluster. 
The summary of our finding with respect to TCP 
connection simulation is that while PDNS is fast for 
“elephant” connections (long-lived/high-throughput), 
GTNetS fared better for “mice” connections (short-lived).  
Since the payload associated with worms typically tends to 
be small, GTNetS delivered better performance in 
simulating the worm models. 
TCP Worm Models 
Using TCP-based worm models mimicking the Code 
Red II worm, we ran experiments to test the feasibility of 
large-scale high-fidelity worm modeling.  For our TCP 
worm experiments, we simulated a clique network of core 
routers, mapped one per CPU.  A two-level tree hangs off 
each core router, with parameterized fan-out at each level.  
A 128,000 node network is instantiated on 128 CPUs, with 
a tree of 10x100 on each CPU.  Similarly, a 64,000 node 
network uses 64 CPUs, with 10x100 nodes mapped per 
CPU.  The 1.28 million node network contains a 100x100-
node tree per CPU.  Figure 3 plots the propagation of the 
TCP-based worm.  This execution is among the largest TCP 
worm models simulated to date at packet-level. 
TCP vs. UDP Worm Models 
We have modeled both TCP and UDP versions of the 
worms and have found a significant difference 
implementation complexity between the two.  TCP worms 
are more complex to model, due to bookkeeping 
complexities in connection establishment, and the need for 
creating a new TCP agent object for every new random 
connection.  Such complexity is absent in UDP models, as it 
is sufficient to simply send a packet with the worm payload 
and easily mark the destination node as infected when the 
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Figure 4: Propagation of a Code Red II-like worm in 
relatively smaller networks, modeled at packet-level in 
GTNetS. 
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Figure 4 plots the propagation of the same TCP-based 
worm on networks of 64,000 and 128,000 nodes. 
UDP Worm Models 
 
Figure 5: Propagation of Slammer-like UDP worm through 
307,200 nodes of a complex network topology.  Entire 
simulation is performed at packet-level in PDNS on a 128-
CPU Linux cluster. 
Using packet-level models of a UDP worm similar to the 
SQL Slammer, we have simulated the worm propagation on 
a large-scale network containing over 300,000 end-hosts.  
Results from a sample worm propagation experiment on the 
300,000 node network are shown in Figure 5.  The network 
topology consists of several “university campus-like” 
subnets connected via a network of gateway routers.  Each 
campus subnet consists of roughly 30 routers and 508 end-
hosts. 
This experiment represents results from among the 
largest packet-level worm simulations to date that we are 
aware of.  It is presented to illustrate the scale at which all 
packet-level models can be simulated using current day’s 
computation platforms and simulation tools.  It captures all 
network details, such as queuing and congestion at routers, 
etc.  The worm is seen to follow the expected well-behaved 
trajectory of an epidemic model, more importantly.  
However, more importantly, the additional power of 
packet-level model lies in its ability to easily accommodate 
complex variations to the worm behavior (e.g., intelligent hit 
list scanning), and dynamics of network topologies, 
background traffic intensities, etc. 
4. Constructive Emulation 
Armed with the ability to perform high-fidelity 
simulation of worm models, we were ready to face our next 
challenge.  In our projects related to modeling and 
simulation of military networks, we were tasked to explore 
exercising actual network security installations against 
simulated scenarios of large-scale worm attacks.  Testing the 
security systems against simulated attacks provides the 
benefits of flexible, controllable and repeatable experiments, 
in contrast to using live testbeds.  The initial candidate 
installation to be tested was that of a honeypot system.  
While at first it appeared to be a straightforward application 
of traditional network emulation techniques, closer analysis 
revealed that such a scenario represented a higher-fidelity 
experiment that requires a new emulation capability, as 
described next. 
4.1. Emulation Architectures 
 
Virtual Real Real
E.g. Honeypot               Router/link models             End-hosts
      installation                     in PDNS                        (worms) 




E.g. Honeypot             Router/link models       End-host models
      installation                    in PDNS              (worms) in PDNS
Figure 7: Constructive emulation architecture. 
A drawback of existing emulation systems is that they 
require end-hosts to be realized as real end-host systems.  
The traditional emulation architecture is shown in .  
For example, worm infections will need to originate and 
terminate in real hosts.  However, this makes it difficult to 
experiment with very large number of vulnerable end-hosts 
in worm propagation experiments. 
A majority of existing emulation systems, including the 
most scalable ones, such as Netbed[2] of University of Utah 
and MAYA[19] of UCLA, allow the simulated portion of 
the emulation to only act as a transport plane, without 
network endpoints.  The LARIAT[3] system of MIT 
supports virtual end-host applications, but is limited by very 
low-fidelity network models.  In our worm emulation 
scenarios (e.g., honeypot emulation, as described next), 
however, we need simulated vulnerable/infected nodes to 
interact directly as endpoints of worm infections with actual 
honeypot installations.  The virtual portion of the emulation 
system is thus required to maintain all the state associated 
with every interaction endpoint (actual or potential) that can 
interact with real endpoint system.  For example, full TCP 
state machine needs to be modeled and maintained at each 
simulated end point.  Traditional emulation systems are 
neither equipped to maintain such state, nor possess the 
necessary translation mechanisms to bridge the 
semantic/representational gap between modeled endpoints 
and real systems.  In traditional emulation systems, this 
would require thousands of real hosts to be configured and 
integrated into the emulation setup, to be able to 
experiment with large-scale worm propagation at high-
fidelity.  Instead, it is desirable to have only a small subset of 
end-hosts realized as real hosts, while the rest of the end-
hosts is instantiated virtually inside simulation, as depicted 
in Figure 7.  For example, it is sufficient to realize the 
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honeypot installation(s) on real hosts (say, configured and 
run on Linux), while the worms themselves originate from 
end-hosts simulated inside the network simulator.  This 
makes it possible to achieve scalable execution of worm 
propagation (inside the simulator), while still retaining the 
ability to test honeypot installations against large-scale worm 
attacks. 
Our constructive emulation approach solves precisely this 
problem, by its ability to interface real operational systems 
directly with simulated end-host applications.  The objective 
of this approach is a setup which essentially bridges 
simulated network and real network in a “peer-to-peer” 
fashion.  This setup can then be used to plug-in real 
network applications into simulated networks to measure 
effectiveness and other metrics.  To demonstrate the 
capability of our emulation interface, we have integrated 
honeyd, which is a popular real honeypot implementation, 
with our worm simulation models.  Honeyd[20, 21] is a low-
interaction, but highly scalable, honeypot framework.  
Other equivalent systems are also well-documented in the 
network security literature (e.g., see the Honeynet 
project[22]). 
4.2. Example: Honeypot Emulation 
Honeypots are introduced into the simulation using the 
following scheme.  The entire network of interest is 
configured with end-hosts and routers, as usual, in the 
simulator.  However, at the end-hosts where honeypots 
need to be inserted, those end-hosts are marked as 
“emulated nodes”.  In these nodes, special “Emulated TCP” 
agents are used instead of the usual simulation models of 
TCP.  The emulated TCP agents do not have any TCP end-
point behavior by themselves, but simply act as conduits to 
the TCP stacks inside the actual honeypots.  For example, 
when a SYN packet event is received at an emulated node, 
the emulated TCP agent performs some simple conversions 
to format it into a bonafide network packet, and forwards it 
to the honeypot (via a proxy server, as will be described 
later). The emulated TCP agent maintains minimal state 
required to translate from simulation events to network 
packets and vice versa (e.g., translating sequence numbers).  
Each virtual IP address hosted by the honeypot is 
represented and associated with a corresponding emulated 
node in the simulator. 
Since we use parallel/distributed execution for 
simulating the network, the network is partitioned among 
multiple processors.  We need to distinguish among the 
processors based on whether they hold any emulated nodes 
or not.  If a processor does not house any emulated nodes, 
it executes normally in an as-fast-as-possible (AFAP) mode 
as though only simulation is performed (i.e., oblivious to 
emulation).  Processors that house emulated nodes need to 
perform special initialization, to set up conduits to the 
honeypot installation.  This is done via simple socket-based 
communication between the emulator processor and its 
honeypot endpoints.  Additionally, the simulation loop is 
modified to accept incoming packets and emit outgoing 
packets, and to pace the simulation execution with real-time.  
PDNS- AFAP
Packet capture 






























Public Network Private Network  
Figure 8: Constructive emulation setup of the Honeyd 
honeypot with parallel simulation of worm models in PDNS. 
Figure 8
The entire honeypot emulation setup essentially 
comprises of a public network in which the network 
simulator runs, and a private network which represents the 
protected sub-domain of the honeypot (see ).  An 
emulator “proxy server” bridges these networks. 
In our PDNS execution, two types of PDNS instances 
run in the public network: AFAP and Real. The PDNS-Real 
instances instantiate an emulator object which registers itself 
with the proxy server. During registration, the emulator 
object sends the instance ID and the IP address range it 
covers. Using this information the proxy maintains a 
connection table to route traffic to/from simulated from/to 
the honeypot.  When instantiating the emulator object, the 
user specifies the range of IP addresses this PDNS instance 
will cover in the entire network.  This information is used 
by the emulator to register itself with the proxy server.  A 
TCP connection is established between the emulator and 
the proxy during the registration process and is held open 
throughout the simulation to exchange packets with the 
proxy server. 
Experimental Hardware Setup 
 
Figure 9: Hardware hosting platform for constructive 
emulation: user installation (honeyd) is connected over a 
wide area connection to a compute cluster that executes 
worm models in PDNS.  The user installation of network 
defense could be a single end-host or an entire subnet. 
Figure 9 shows the hardware setup for honeypot 
emulation.  The machine running the proxy server is 
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equipped with two network interface card to bridge the 
public and the private network.  A DHCP daemon is started 
on one of the network cards, which will act as a gateway for 
honeyd running on the private network. Since honeyd 
simulates virtual IP addresses, a route entry is added to 
forward packets destined to the virtual IP addresses on to 
this network card.   To avoid the runtime overhead of an 
ARP lookup at the proxy server for honeyd’s virtual IP 
addresses, we hardcode the mapping of the virtual IP 
addresses to honeyd’s MAC address in the proxy’s ARP table. 
The proxy server listens for packets from both sides of 
the
4.3. Emulation Issues 
ting a constructive 
em
Traffic Conversion 
nce numbers for TCP connections 
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hecksums are not modeled 
in 
 such conversions need to be performed on a 
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 laptops (an IBM 
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Figure 10: Tracking infections with honeypot emulation. 
a 
sam
ditional emulation.  However, a nuance to be considered 
is related to the fact that the simulator is a 
parallel/distributed simulator.  To maximize runtime 
performance, we implemented a scheme by which the 
AFAP instances are never constrained by real-time, but only 
the instances containing emulated nodes are paced with 
real-time.  This helps one to intelligently balance the 
simulation load across processors, so that most of the 
simulated network is simulated in AFAP mode, while only 
the few processors containing emulated nodes are 
constrained by real-time.   
Another sticky issue is a network (PDNS and honeyd). It uses a set of iptables[23] 
rules to capture packets from honeyd and encapsulate them 
to insert into PDNS, and uses raw sockets to emit 
forwarded packets onto the honeyd side. 
factor called lookahead [24] is crucial for efficient parallel 
execution of the simulators.  We expand this notion by 
introducing an additional type of lookahead.  The two kinds 
of lookahead are: simulation lookahead and emulation 
lookahead.  The former is the lookahead we need to 
perform parallel network simulation.  The latter is the 
lookahead between the real network and the processors 
with emulated nodes. 
We omit the details
Several issues arose in implemen
ulation architecture.  Some of these issues are discussed 
next. 
ace.  Both schemes are essential to ensuring maximal 
parallelism in the entire system. In PDNS, seque
ays start at a fixed value (zero). But, in real TCP 
implementations, such as used in the honeypot, TCP 
packets start at randomly generated sequence numbers.  The 
sequence numbers need to be dynamically translated to 
match the receiver’s view, to prevent incorrect packet drops 
or packet buffering.  We have solved this problem by 
bridging the gap with a conversion module inside the 
emulated TCP agents in PDNS. 
Similarly, both TCP and IP c
In an experimental setup, we used two
ntium-4 ThinkPad, and an IBM Pentium-III ThinkPad), 
running the proxy server and honeyd respectively.  The Code 
Red II worm model previously described was used to attack 
a network in which honeyd was implanted into a 2-CPU 
PDNS execution.  As expected, honeyd received and logged 
incoming TCP malicious connections.  As we did not have 
any other traffic destined to the honeypot, every incoming 
TCP connection at honeyd constituted a worm 
scan/infection attempt.  We used honeyd’s virtual subsystem 
feature to add our own application to log the number of 
infections.  The total number of infections in the rest of the 
(simulated) network was also logged in the PDNS simulator. 
PDNS, but are required for real packets.  Again, we 
resolved this by generating (stripping) checksums just 
before (after) packet emission (reception) in the emulated 
TCP agent. 
Note that
r-connection basis, and hence state needs to be 
maintained for each connection (e.g., starting sequence 
numbers).  The emulated TCP agents are natural holding 
points for such state. 
 a. Infections in honeypot       b. Infections in entire network
In a network simulato
queueing the next earliest event and advancing to its 
timestamp. Thus, the simulator finishes processing all 
events in an as-fast-as-possible fashion.  But when 
interfaced with a real network, packet arrivals are dynamic. 
Packets can arrive at unpredictable times from the real 
network.  This prevents the simulator from running as fast 
as possible, and instead mandates real time pacing.  Real 
time pacing was hence added into the main event processing 
loop of PDNS. 
Constructive 
Figure 10 a & b show the propagation of the worm in 
ple 200-node network (simulated on 2 CPUs) and the 
number of infection attempts logged by honeyd.  As can be 
expected, the number of infections in the honeypot roughly 
tracks the total infections in the entire network, accurately 
reflecting the fact that uniformly random addresses are 
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generated by our worm model.  In larger experiments, we 
are able to run the honeypot with networks containing tens 
of thousands of nodes (by running the simulation on a 
suitably larger number of CPUs). 
We note that while honeypot-based tracking is not novel, 
the
5. Full System Virtualization 
ccounting for 
ma
 generally do not 
mo
5.1. Virtualization Technology 
ing a software 
sys
5.2. High-Fidelity Models & Virtualization 
vir
leaves two issues to resolve: 
co
5.3. Related Work 
ts are in fact moving in the 
dir
 ability to plug-in actual honeypot installations into large 
virtual network has not been realized before. 
Packet-level modeling goes a long way in a
ny network dynamics and application characteristics that 
are hard to accommodate in aggregate methods like 
epidemic modeling.  Emulations (traditional and 
constructive) help enhance the fidelity of packet-level 
models to even higher levels by incorporating actual systems 
into portions of simulated scenarios.  However, packet-level 
simulations are limited in fidelity by the amount of detail 
incorporated into their models.  Emulations are limited in 
scalability due to the imperative for real-time execution to 
keep up with their real-system components.  For scenarios 
demanding even higher levels of fidelity at large scale, 
alternative methods need to be adopted. 
For example, packet-level simulations
del operating system effects such as process scheduling 
delays.  Other details in worm behavior, such as root 
exploits, are extremely hard to model at fine level of detail.  
Nevertheless, researchers would greatly benefit from the 
possibility of capturing full system effects at large-scale.   
Execution at that combination of fidelity and scale cannot 
be met by existing packet-level or emulation methods.  Also, 
modeling at that level of detail entails prohibitively 
expensive model development efforts, which can approach 
the effort of building the real systems themselves.  In fact, it 
is precisely this observation (of the models having to 
asymptotically approach the real systems themselves) which 
leads to our next modeling alternative, namely, fully 
virtualized system. 
Virtualization is an approach to enabl
tem designed for one platform to execute on a different 
platform.  For example, while the Linux operating system is 
originally designed to execute directly on native hardware, 
virtualization technology can enable the same operating 
system to execute on top of another “host” operating 
system.  The host system provides a virtual platform layer to 
make the hosted system oblivious to the changed 
environment.  Virtualization technology is recently gaining 
significant attention, with many systems being virtualized.  
For example, it is now possible to boot up multiple 
Windows operating systems as mere processes hosted by 
another Windows operating system instance.  Similar 
capabilities exist for Linux and other systems as well.  With 
optimizations, virtualized systems are achieving acceptable 
performance. 
In the context of high-fidelity computer worm modeling, 
tualization technology can be applied to circumvent the 
traditional conflict between scalability and fidelity.  Imagine 
an internet that entirely executes not by real-time clocks, but 
on virtual (simulation) clocks.  Such a network not only 
retains the highest fidelity level, but is delinked from real-
time completely.  This can be achieved as follows.  Network 
links and routers are modeled using traditional packet-level 
(parallel/distributed) network simulators.  End-hosts are 
modeled as real systems themselves, with full blown 
operating system, file systems, etc.  However, unlike 
emulation systems that have end-hosts running on real 
hardware, the end-hosts are executed in virtualized 
environments.  Since the end-hosts are now under the 
control of a host, they are not free-running anymore, and 
hence can be controlled at will.  Since the network is 
executed as a (packet-level) simulation, its execution is also 
already controllable. 
This approach 
mmunication and timing.  The first, namely, network 
communication, is easily patched between the network 
simulator and the virtualized end-hosts by converting packet 
exchanges into simulation time-stamped events.  Events 
encapsulate actual network packets.  The second issue, 
namely timing, is more complex.  To be able to fully 
virtualize the entire set of network-and-endhosts, it is 
necessary to synchronize their execution according to 
simulation time.  Without proper synchronization, we are 
faced again with the original real-time execution constraint 
of emulation systems.  Instead, time advances are carefully 
controlled by simulation clock.  When a virtual operating 
system instance queries for hardware clock value, the host 
operating system is made to supply it the simulation clock 
value, rather than real-time clock value.  Elapsed time is 
estimated using similar techniques (e.g., Direct 
Execution[25]).  The simulation clock is synchronized 
across parallel network simulator and virtual system hosts 
using standard parallel/distributed discrete event simulation 
techniques.  The net effect of these arrangements is that all 
components of the entire system are lifted away from real-
time and placed on a controllable virtual timeline. 
Recent emulation effor
ection of virtualization.  Netbed/EmuLab[2] has recently 
added some support for virtual nodes[26] to multiplex more 
than one end-host or router on the same physical resource.  
Our work differs from virtual nodes of Netbed in that we 
are interested in virtualizing the entire system, including the 
end-hosts and routers.  This involves re-mapping real-time 
of the end-hosts (virtualized end-hosts) to simulation time 
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that is synchronized with the network (routers).  In existing 
emulation/live methods, end-hosts are paced by real-time, 
whether they are multiplexed or not.  Due to this 
requirement and other reasons, existing methods are 
typically difficult to scale to more than a few hundreds of 
end-hosts. 
5.4. Implementation Systems 
of virtualization 
alt
n incur significant 
me
6. Conclusions and Future Work 
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